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Walker: Amalgamation of Interlocutory Orders into One Final Judgment.

AMALGAMATION OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
INTO ONE FINAL JUDGMENT
ORVILLE C. WALKER*

A shibboleth of appellate procedure declares that an appeal can only
be taken from a final judgment,' with certain statutory exceptions. 2 As
appellate jurisdiction must rest upon the finality of the judgment it is
surprising to observe the countless appeals that have been dismissed due
to a non-final order. This is usually due to one of two reasons, either the
judgment has been inartfully drawn which fails to dispose of all matters
and parties involved in the suit, or the appeal has been prematurely
brought. In the former situation the Texas Supreme Court in the early
case of Trammell v. Rosen3 announced the doctrine of disposal by implication in order to create a final judgment. The court recently liberalized the doctrine in North East Independent School District v.
A ldridge.4 As a result of these two decisions fewer dismissals have occurred as a result of poorly drafted judgments. It is the latter situation
to which this article is addressed.
It has long been the rule that only one final judgment shall be
rendered in any cause except where it is otherwise specifically provided
by law. 5 It frequently happens during the progress of a trial that a series
of orders are entered, each being interlocutory and nonappealable; however, the last such order entered may dispose of the entire case. Is it
necessary that one instrument be drafted which merges all of the previous orders into one final judgment? In the 1961 case of McEwen v.
HarrisonOthe Texas Supreme Court attempted to answer this question.
In that case an interlocutory default judgment had been taken against
Texaco, Inc. Thereafter, the plaintiffs took a non-suit as to the other
two defendants. The court held that upon the taking of the non-suit as
to the remaining defendants the earlier default judgment against Texaco
thereupon became final as of the date of taking the non-suit. Upon the
second appeal in Texaco, Inc. v. McEwen7 it was held that the time for
appeal or writ of error by Texaco started to run from the entry of the
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University. B.A., Howard Payne College; LL.B., University of Texas.
1 Tx. Rxv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 2249 (1964); Tax. R. Civ. P. 467.
2 Tax. Rxv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2008, 2250, 2251 (1964).
8 106 Tex. 132, 157 S.W. 1161 (1913).
4 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
5 TEx. R. Civ. P. 301.
6 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961).
7356 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2022], No. 2, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 3:207

final judgment, that is, the order disposing of the remaining defendants.
Fortunately, for Texaco, it perfected its appeal by writ of error within
six months from the date of the non-suit."
Just two years later a similar situation arose in H. B. Zachry Co. v.
Thibodeaux9 where suit was brought against a city and a contractor.
The trial court granted the contractor's motion for summary judgment.
Thereafter, on motion of the plaintiff, the trial court dismissed the suit
as to the city. In dismissing the appeal, the court of civil appeals held
both orders (of April 18 and May 3) to be interlocutory and that no
final judgment had been rendered. The supreme court said: "We adhere
to the holdings of the McEwen cases. Since the holding in the Zachry
case is contrary, we are authorized under Rule 483, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, to reverse this cause without granting the application for
writ of error."' 1 The case was remanded to the court of civil appeals
to consider the appeal on its merits.'1
Subsequent to the McEwen decision, the case of Craig v. Rio Grande
Electric Cooperative12 involved only a slightly different situation. The
trial court had sustained defendant, Rio Grande Electric Cooperative's
motion for summary judgment, but denied the motions of the two
other defendants. Subsequently plaintiff's suit against these defendants
was severed from his suit against the electric company. The severance
effectively confirmed the previous order granting the electric company's
motion for summary judgment and made the summary judgment in
favor of the electric company final and appealable. It seems clear that
it is not necessary that the finality of a judgment be dependent upon
one instrument.
At this point it would also seem immaterial by what method a party
defendant is disposed of so long as all that remains is the earlier interlocutory order or orders which have now ripened into a final and therefore appealable judgment.$8 Furthermore, there would seem to be no
obstacle insofar as any violation of the rule prohibiting the entry of
more than one final judgment. The evident purpose of the McEwen
and Zachry cases was to permit the amalgamation of several nonappealable orders into one final judgment thereby opening the door to im8 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2255 (1964).
9 364 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Sup. 1963).

10 Id. at 193.

11 Thibodeaux v. H. B. Zachry Co., 368 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12 346 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13 Sears v. Mund Boilers, Inc., 328 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ
ref'd). The court held in the absence of a severance order as to one defendant, the earlier
order sustaining motion for summary judgment was not final and appealable.
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mediate appellate review. Nevertheless, the lower courts have been
reluctant to extend the application of the doctrine of "amalgamation."
The case of Sisttie v. Holland14 involved a suit by plaintiff for personal injuries against two defendants. Each defendant filed separate
motions for summary judgment. A hearing was held on both motions
at the same time. The court granted both motions in separate and
distinct judgments; one judgment was signed on February 8, 1963,
and the other on February 12, 1963. The appellant perfected her appeal
from both judgments which was necessary as neither judgment made
reference to the other nor was the first judgment incorporated into the
latter. On its own motion the court raised the question of the finality of
the judgment. For the first time the court relied upon Rule 301 which
prohibits the rendition of more than one final judgment. The court
said, "If the Wagner judgment is selected as final, even though it disposes of the only party left, as all the other parties were disposed of in
the February 8th judgment, it alone does not dispose of the Hollands
and neither does the Holland judgment dispose of Wagner."' 5
It is interesting to note that the court agreed that the two judgments
together disposed of the entire controversy but that neither alone did
so. Can the judgments be treated as one? The court answered its own
question by saying, "Since the last judgment does not refer in any way
to the first judgment, nor incorporate it, we do not think they can be
treated as one judgment and hence there is no final judgment from
which an appeal will lie to this court."' The court did not cite either
the McEwen or Zachry17 cases. In both of those cases the judgment
appealed from did not make any reference to the other interlocutory
orders. The only possible distinction is that in the Sisttie case there
was an appeal based upon two instruments whereas in the McEwen and
Zachry cases only one of the interlocutory orders (which had later become final) were brought up on appeal. Does Rule 301, prohibiting
the entry of more than one final judgment, preclude the amalgamation
of the two interlocutory orders into one final judgment? Furthermore,
does the fact that there is an appeal from two instruments necessarily
mean there exists two final judgments?
The case of Everett v. Humble Employees West Texas Federal Credit
Union'8 involved the same question as the Sisttie case. Suit was on a
14 374 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, no writ).
15 Id. at 804.
16 Id. at 804.
17 McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961); H. B. Zachry Co. v.
Thibodeaux, 364 S.W.2d 192 (rex. Sup. 1963).
18 377 S.W.2d .232 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1964, no writ).
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note against several defendants. One defendant failed to answer and the
court entered a default judgment as against him on May 23, 1961. The
case proceeded to trial as to the other defendants and judgment was
rendered against them on July 18, 1962. The second judgment made
no order as to the defaulting defendant and did not refer to the prior
judgment. Citing the Sisttie case the court declined to treat the two
interlocutory judgments as one final judgment. It said, "[E]ven if we
ignore the rule of 'one final judgment', there are the ministerial acts
to be performed as to the judgment in the case."' 19 Has the court created
a jurisdictional problem by the failure of the trial court to perform a
ministerial act? Again, the court did not cite either the McEwen or
Zachry cases, evidently not believing them to be in point.
The case of Thomas v. Shult 20 presents a similar situation. The
plaintiff filed suit against two defendants based upon separate and distinct causes of action. A judgment signed on May 7, 1968, sustained one
defendant's plea in abatement on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by limitation. There was a trial as to the other defendant
and a second judgment was entered on May 23, 1968, as a result of a
trial upon the merits. This judgment decreed that the plaintiffs take
nothing as against the defendant. No reference was made to the previous
2
take nothing judgment. The court citing both the Sisttie and Everett '
cases dismissed the appeal. The court stated that the one final judgment
rule had been violated and that, "This one judgment must dispose of
all parties in a suit and all issues." The court is insisting upon one
instrument before two interlocutory orders can otherwise become final.
The case of Thomas v. Shult, for the first time, mentions the McEwen
and Zachry cases but found both cases to be distinguishable. It said, "In
each of them there was an order dismissing the parties from the suit and
there was only one judgment making adjudication on the merits
as to all issues, as between all other parties in the suit." 28 Is this a distinction without a difference? It is true that in the McEwen and Zachry
cases there was an appeal from one interlocutory order which had
culminated in a final judgment. However, it was necessary to enter
another interlocutory order to create the one final judgment. Does
Rule 301 preclude the merger of two interlocutory orders (two instru19 Id. at 233. (Court's emphasis.)
20 436 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ).
21Id. at 196.
22 Id. at 196.
23 Id. at 196.
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ments) into which one .final judgment is evolved, thereby. permitting
appellate review of both?
• .. .
,. .
Materials Co.2 4
v.
Centex
Schell
of
case
the
The problem arose again in
In that case plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and defendant filed
a cross-action. The court, by order dated February 4, 1969, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment that plaintiff take nothing in
his suit and that the cause proceed to trial upon the counterclaim. On
May 19, 1969, the trial court entered a judgment disposing of the crossaction by agreement of the parties. This judgment, while it referred to
the earlier judgment of October 17, did not incorporate such prior
judgment in the May, 1969, judgment. The court thereupon held that
there was an attempted appeal from two interlocutory judgments. The
court said, "Of course, if the two interlocutory judgments are combined,
the entire controversy is determined. This would seem the practical
thing to do, but there is contrary authority." 25 The court felt constrained to follow the Sisttie, Thomas and Everett cases by this language:
"We follow these three opinions of our highly respected peers and hold
that we have no jurisdiction of this appeal for the reason that no final
judgment has been rendered disposing of all parties and all issues. ' 26
On motion for rehearing the court referred to the Zachry and McEwen
27
opinions but adopted the distinction set forth in Thomas v. Shult.
The question persists: Why does Rule 301 prohibit the merger of two
interlocutory orders into one final judgment thereby permitting an appeal of both orders? Are the courts confusing two instruments with the
rule against the entry of more than one final judgment?
We are not without authority that Rule 301 does not stand in the
way of joining the two interlocutory judgments. The case of Starr v.
Koppers Co. 28 is in apparent conflict with the opinions of the four
other courts of civil appeals. In that case plaintiff's suit was against
Koppers Company and Mavor-Kelly Company. Both defendants filed
motions for summary judgment. The motion of Koppers Company was
heard first and in an order signed on March 20, 1965, the court granted
the motion and made an order in this same judgment severing the
cause asserted by Mayor-Kelly. On the same day the trial court heard
Mayor-Kelly's motion and it also was granted. Both motions were heard
24 450 S.W.2d
25 Id. at 676.

673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, no writ).

26 Id. at 677.
27436 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ).
28 398 S.W.2d 827 (TeX. Civ. App.---San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.T.e.).
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and granted under the same cause number and no effort was made to
carry out the order of severance by giving one a new style and number.
An appeal was perfected by treating these two judgments as one, and
filing one appeal bond and transcript. The appellees contended that
one appeal had been attempted from two judgments. The appellate
court considered the severance order as never having been carried into
effect as the trial court disregarded and had impliedly set aside its order
of severance. Consequently, the court said, "[T]hese two judgments
taken together constitute but one final judgment, from which appellant
has prosecuted this appeal. The two orders taken together dispose of
the entire lawsuit. The fact that they were in two instruments does
not prevent them from being one judgment." 29 The court relied upon
H. B. Zachry Co. v. Thibodeaux30 and Texaco v. McEwen.31 The result
of the two supreme court opinions along with Starr v. Koppers Co. is
that a party may appeal from one judgment although it is found in two
instruments and rendered on different dates. Furthermore, the rule
against the entry of more than one final judgment in a case is not
violated.

As previously stated, the case of Schell v. Centex Materials Co. 31'

held that it is not permissible to combine two interlocutory judgments
and appeal from both as one final judgment. The court stated that
Starr was not in point: "As we view that case there were two final judgments, one in each of the severed cases. The irregularity in combining
the appeal from each judgment in one appeal bond and one transcript
was only that and nothing more."33 The court's analysis appears inaccurate. In that case the court did not hold that it is procedurally
possible to appeal from two separate final judgments involving two
lawsuits by perfecting one appeal. The court treated the order of severance not only as incomplete but also as impliedly set aside, resulting
in one appeal from one final judgment.
In view of the foregoing, just what does the rule against the entry
of more than one final judgment mean? Is it legally possible to render
two final judgments in a single cause? It would seem not. To denominate
both judgments as "final" is a meaningless anomaly. If both judgments
are required to fully adjudicate the rights of all parties and all issues,
then neither can be a final judgment.
Id. at 828.
30 364 S.W.2d 192 (rex. Sup. 1963).
29

356 S.W.2d'809 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
32 450 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, no writ).
33 Id. at 677.
81
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The underlying purpose of Rule 301 providing for the rendition of
one final judgment is to preclude piecemeal appeals. A judgment might
very well be final as to one party without adjudicating the rights of
another party to the lawsuit. A trial court may not create for itself a
so-called final judgment thereby giving one party an immediate right
of appeal. In federal court, Rule 54(b) provides: "[T]he court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay . . .-4 thereby giving an immediate right of
appeal. However, Rule 301 prohibits such a procedure in our state
courts.
The rule annouuced in the Zachry, McEwen and Starr decisions simply allows the amalgamation of two interlocutory orders into one final
judgment. The one final judgment rule does not mean that there must
be one instrument in which the judgment is found. The decisions in
Sisttie v. Holland, Everett v. Humble Employees West Texas Federal
Credit Union, Thomas v. Shult, and Schell v. Centex Materials Co. are
based upon the contrary assumption.
Finally, it is significant that only Starr v. Koppers Co. has a writ
history. The application for writ of error was refused, no reversible
error. The lower court had declined to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, reversing and remanding the case upon the merits. Had the
Texas Supreme Court not agreed with the jurisdictional problem, it
would have granted the writ to the extent of remanding the cause back
to the court of civil appeals with instructions to dismiss it. Instead the
supreme court, by its refusal of the application for writ of error, passed
upon the merits of the case and by indirection approved the jurisdictional question decided by the lower court.
What has been said should not be interpreted to mean that an appeal
from two interlocutory orders is good practice. While it is not essential
to its finality, good draftsmanship dictates that the last judgment prepared should not only incorporate by reference the earlier judgment
but also should reaffirm each of the earlier interlocutory orders. Certainly, this should be adopted as a "safe rule" due to the uncertainty
in the law as it now stands.
Furthermore, the two interlocutory orders could very well be woven
into one instrument to avoid the very real possibility of dismissal under
the present uncertainty in the law. As already stated, a dismissal of an
appeal to compel the parties to return to the trial court and require the
84 FED. R. Cv. P. 54(b).
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trial court to perform the ministerial act of entering a "single instrument judgment" (thus causing additional expense and delay due to a
second appeal of the same case) seems unwise and bad law. Additionally, this does violence to the well established rule that statutes giving
the right of appeal should be liberally construed in favor of that right. 85
35TEx. R. Civ. P. 1:
The proper objective of rules of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable
and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of
substantive law. To the end that this objective may be attained with as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense both to the litigants and to the state as
may be practicable, these rules shall be given a liberal construction.
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